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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal concerns appellant Jeffrey E. Huber's ("Huber") ultimate termination from 
his position as a high level employee by respondent Lightforce USA, Incorporated d/b/a 
Nightforce Optics ("LFUSA" or "Lightforce") because of his unsatisfactory job performance. 
LFUSA offered Huber a 12-month notice period, LFUSA paid Huber his base salary, plus 
benefits during that time. After accepting final payment, Huber filed a lawsuit in Clearwater 
County seeking to recover an additional $11 million under two agreements: a Company Share 
Offer ("CSO"), which was a statutory ERISA "Top Hat" plan, and a Deed of Non-Disclosure, 
Non-Competition and Assignment, which Huber always called a "Noncompetition Agreement" 
or an "NDA" before this appeal. 
The case proceeded to a bench trial on October 21, 2013, with Huber seeking 
approximately $3.5 million under the CSO and $200,000 under the NDA. Following six full days 
of presentation of evidence involving over 40 trial exhibits and testimony by 24 witnesses, the 
trial concluded on October 31, 2013. On December 10, 2013, the trial court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings") (R 1409-21) and a separate Judgment. R 1422-23. 
The trial court agreed in spades with LFUSA that Huber was terminated for unsatisfactory 
performance, stating: 
Huber often berated, belittled, and harassed employees. He 
micromanaged all phases of LFUSA and did not allow the department 
managers to properly perform their responsibilities. Dennis tried to address 
Huber's dictatorial management style by installing a group management system 
where Huber would be director of research and development and be on the same 
management level as all of the other department managers. The department 
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managers (OMO) would meet and make joint decisions. Huber did not cooperate 
with the OMG and continued to interfere with other departments. Dennis then 
removed Huber as the department manager for research and development and 
removed Huber from the OMG. The OMG then began to function as a group, but 
Huber continued to try and exercise influence over the other departments and 
continued to be hostile to other employees. 
Huber's demeanor and management style were unprofessional and 
directly interfered with the business operation of LFUSA. 
Huber's actions in managing LFUSA as its vice-president were also 
unprofessional. As indicated previously LFUSA had a significant production 
problem at the end of June, 2010. Unfilled orders were excessive. Rather than 
address the issue by examining what needed to be done to increase production to 
meet the incoming orders and reduce the time needed to fill orders, Huber 
directed staff members to present false data to LF A's board of advisors to make 
it look like there was no production problem. 
Huber consistently hid information from LF A's board if he did not feel 
that it reflected favorably on himself. 
The timing of Huber's termination from LFUSA was dictated by the other 
employees' threats that they would quit if Huber remained with LFUSA. 
However, the actual reasons for his termination were an accumulation of factors 
summarized in the August 3, 2011 letter (Plaintiffs exhibit P-31). 
* * * 
A reasonable person would find that Huber's actions as vice-president 
(failing to address production issues), management style, demeanor, and 
unprofessional treatment of LFUSA employees collectively amount to 
unsatisfactory performance. 
R 1418-19 (emphasis added). According to the trial court, Huber's misrepresentation to 
LFUSA's Board not only amounted to unsatisfactory performance, but "ft/his deceit on Huber's 
part amounts to willful misconduct, is a serious breach of company policy and procedure, and 
is fraudulent behavior . ... " R 1415 ( emphasis added). In issuing its Findings, the trial court 
also weighed the evidence presented and found the testimony of LFUSA's main witnesses-
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Dr. Raymond Dennis ("Dennis"), Monica Leniger-Sherratt ("Leniger-Sherratt") and Hope 
Coleman ("Coleman")-credible, but the court also found that Huber's testimony was not 
credible. R 1414. The trial court's credibility findings were never addressed in Huber's opening 
brief and are therefore not challenged in this appeal. 
Against this background, the trial court concluded that Huber was entitled to damages of 
$180,000 under the NDA. Because Huber's employment was terminated for unsatisfactory 
performance, the trial court held Huber's right to benefits under the CSO were forfeited. 
Thereafter, the court awarded LFUSA $284,464.76 in attorney fees and costs as the prevailing 
party and refused to award Huber any of his attorney fees or costs. R 1988. Huber appealed 
nearly every issue. 
B. The Course of Proceedings. 
Although LFUSA disagrees with the substance of some of Huber's contentions, 
Appellant's Opening Brief adequately sets forth the course of proceedings in the trial court and 
the disposition of the case. 
C. Additional Issues on Appeal. 
LFUSA requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rules 40 and 41, Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-120(3), and 29 U.S.C. § 1332(g). 
D. Statement of the Facts. 
LFUSA is a Washington corporation owned by Dr. Raymond Dennis, an Australian 
citizen, with its principal operations in Orofino, Idaho. R 193, ~ 2; R 208, ~ 2; Tr Vol. 6, p. 1115, 
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LL. 1-7; R 571,, 2. Dennis, as well as LFUSA's Board of Advisors ("Board"), 1 are located in 
Australia, Tr Vol. 5, p. 775, L. 23 -p. 776, L. 2, and formal communications between LFUSA's 
operations and its Board, as well as company-wide decision-making, occur primarily during 
monthly telephonic Board meetings. Tr Vol. 2, p. 135, L. 25 - p. 136, L. 13; Tr Vol. 5, p. 775, 
L. 23 - p. 776, L. 9; id., p. 779, LL. 15-24. Because of the interrelationship between operations in 
Orofino and the Board and President in Australia, open and transparent reporting by the 
managers in Orofino to Lightforce's Board and Dennis in Australia is critical to the business, id., 
p. 774, LL. 8-20, and the requirement that reporting be open, accurate and transparent was 
communicated to the managers in Orofino. Id., p. 779, LL. 15-24. 
From 1997 through mid-2010, Huber served as LFUSA's Vice President. Id., p. 767, 
LL. 7-15,· Tr Vol. 4, p. 651, LL. 5-15; id., p. 699, L. 6 -p. 700, L. 5. Because Dennis operated an 
international business from Australia, Huber's loyalty was key. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1126, LL. 10-17; 
Tr Vol. 4, p. 653, L. 18 - p. 654, L. 4. As Vice President, Huber was the primary person 
responsible for the overall management and operation of LFUSA's facilities. Tr Vol. 4, p. 651, 
L. 16 -p. 654, L. 4. As Vice President (and ultimately R&D Manager), Huber was highly 
compensated. Prior to his termination, Huber's executive compensation package included (1) a 
base salary of$180,000, (2) participation in Lightforce's simple ERlSA qualified 401(k) plan, 
(3) full fringe benefits, including full health insurance, life insurance, accidental death and 
1 Dennis owns Lightforce Australia ("LFA"), in addition to LFUSA. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1115, 
L. 23-p. 1117, L. 6. Both LFUSA and LFA are governed by the same Board. See Tr Vol. 5, 
p. 775, L. 23 - p. 776, L. 2. 
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dismemberment insurance, and short-term and long-term disability insurance, and (4) paid 
holidays. Tr Vol. 5, p. 766, LL. 11-21. 
1. On October 9, 2000, Huber and Dennis sign the CSO (Ex. P-1). 
In 2000, LFUSA relocated to Orofino, Idaho. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1137, L. 9 -p. 1138, L. 3. 
Relocation was a large and expensive undertaking for LFUSA. Id, p. 1137, LL. 9-23. Dennis 
expended considerable company resources to relocate staff, and purchase land and infrastructure 
and ensure the continued viability of the business. Id. Relocation was also a large undertaking for 
Huber, and prior to relocating, Huber requested additional compensation from Dennis. Id, 
p. 1124, L. 7 - p. 1125, L. 20; id, p. 1137, L. 24 p. 1138, L. 3; Ex. P-1. In response, LFUSA 
offered him the benefits of the CSO, which was a supplemental executive or "Top Hat" plan that 
stated: "Lightforce USA Inc., offers Jeff Huber the following Goodwill, company share offer on 
the basis of long term employment and loyalty." Ex. P-1, p. 1. LFUSA did not offer the CSO to 
its other employees making the move. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1129, LL. 9-13. In fact, Huber was the only 
employee of LFUSA ever offered the opportunity to participate in the CSO. Id 
Per the terms of the CSO, Huber's receipt of its benefits (i.e., goodwill) was expressly 
conditioned upon Huber's continued employment, loyalty and satisfactory performance with 
Lightforce. 2 The CSO contained a clear forfeiture clause, providing: "If Jeff Huber elects to 
leave voluntarily, or employment is terminated due to unsatisfactory performance, then all 
2 Ex. P-1, CSO, § 5 ("Jeff Huber to maintain his focus and business interests in LFUSA. As 
the business grows much of his role will become focused on new product development and the 
potential markets for their exploitation. Consequently it is essential that these areas be capitalised 
for the benefit of LFUSA."). As Dennis testified, where Dennis was working in Australia and 
operating a company in the United States, loyalty was everything. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1126, LL. 10-17. 
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goodwill is lost." See Ex. P-1, § 4 (emphasis added). If Huber satisfied the contractual 
conditions, then goodwill would be paid to Huber in different ways, depending on the 
occurrence: 
a) Death, ill health or incapacitation of Jeff Huber - LFUSA take out insurance 
cover to the value of$1,000,000 on Jeff Huber. At the time Jeff Huber is paid via 
this insurance policy using his goodwill value, this is determined by two 
independent valuations. The cost of these valuations to be covered 50/50 by 
LFUSA and Jeff Huber. 
b) If Jeff Huber elects to leave voluntarily, or employment is terminated due to 
unsatisfactory performance, then all goodwill is lost. 
c) If Jeff Huber retires at a reasonable age and NO sale of business is pending he 
shall be given the option of exchanging the goodwill accumulated for shares in 
the company to the value calculated to be the equivalent to goodwill at the time. 
This is to be done using two independent valuations. 
Ex. P-1, § 4 (emphasis added). 
The life insurance policy authorized by section 4(a) was a $1 million term life insurance 
policy, with no cash value. Ex. D-9 at 3; Tr Vol. 6, p. 1045, L. 18-p. 1047, L. l; R 1410. 
LFUSA was to be the owner and beneficiary of that policy. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1052, LL. 2-4; id., 
p. 1131, L. 14 - p. 1132, L. 18. In the event of Huber's death, and after the two valuations, 
LFUSA would pay Huber's estate the value of Huber's goodwill. Id. The remainder of the funds 
in the policy, if any, would be used as "key man" or replacement funds to fill Huber's role. Id. 
LFUSA took no effort to separate or segregate the life insurance policy from the company's 
other assets.R571, i1 7. The life insurance policy was not a mechanism to fund the CSO in the 
event of Huber's retirement or involuntary separation from service. Tr Vol. 6, p. 113 2, L. 19 -
p. 113 4, L. 3. In the event of Huber's retirement, the CSO provided that he would have the 
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option ofreceiving cash from the general assets of the company or shares in the company. Id. 
See also Ex. P-1, § 4(c). 
The CSO was not vested. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1128, LL. 9-15. Huber testified that he 
understood-when he signed the CSO-that he needed to continue to be loyal to LFUSA in 
order to be entitled to anything under the CSO, that he was required to maintain his focus and 
business interests in LFUSA in order to receive anything under the CSO, and that if his 
employment was terminated for unsatisfactory performance he would forfeit any benefit under 
the CSO. See Tr Vol. 4, p. 653, L. 9 - p. 655, L. 8. Despite this acknowledgment, Huber, on 
behalf of LFUSA, took out the $1 million term life insurance policy with Farm Bureau in 2003. 
Ex. D-9. Although Huber did not obtain approval from LFUSA to do so, he named himself as the 
"owner" of the policy and converted 50% of the death benefit, naming his parents 50% 
beneficiaries under the policy. Tr Vol. 6,p. 1131, L. 8-p. 1132, L. 18; id.,p.1054, L.19-
p. 1055, L. 6. On the insurance application he signed, Huber is represented as the "owner" of 
LFUSA.3 Id., p. 1050, L. 6 - p. 1052, L. 25; Tr Vol. 7, p. 1491, L. 14 - p. 149 2, L. 1. Huber had 
contributed no money to the company and was not even "an" owner of LFUSA, but instead was 
onlyanemployeeofLFUSA. Tr Vol. 4,p. 650, LL. 4-15; id.,p. 670, LL. 17-21. 
3 Mike Asker, the Farm Bureau agent who issued the policy, testified that he was unclear 
about Huber's status, stating that he thought Huber "had a major part in the company, and I also 
knew he had partners overseas. So I knew that Jeff wasn't a full and sole owner of the business." 
Tr Vol. 6, p. 1050, LL. 6-15. However, Huber either affirmatively held himself out to the public 
as the owner of LFUSA during his tenure as Vice President or did not take any action to correct 
the misstatement with Mr. Asker. See also Tr Vol. 7, p. 1491, LL. 14-22. 
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In 2006, Huber ( again signing an application identifying himself as the "owner" of 
LFUSA) converted $250,000 of the $1 million term policy into a whole life policy. Tr Vol. 7, 
p. 1491, L. 14 - p. 149 2, L. 1. Huber did not seek or obtain Dennis' s approval to make this 
conversion. Id. This time Huber, without Dennis's permission, made himself the owner of the 
$250,000 whole life policy and put his wife and LFUSA as 50% beneficiaries of that policy. Id.; 
Tr Vol. 6, p. 1050, L. 16 - p. 1052, L. 25; id., p. 1132, LL. 8-18. Dennis testified that he never 
gave Huber permission to name either Huber's parents as beneficiaries or to name himself as an 
owner of the policy, testifying that he had no idea Huber had done that. Id., p. 1132, LL. 8-18. 
The evidence at trial did not establish that the cash value of any life insurance policy was 
available to Huber if Huber left the company. Huber testified that he did not have LFUSA's 
permission to name himself as owner of any policy. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1491, L. 14 - p. 1492, L. 1. 
Huber testified that he did not mean for that to happen.4 Huber did not pay taxes on any benefit 
under the CSO-including premiums paid on the life insurance policies--during the term of his 
employment. Tr Vol. 4, p. 657, LL. 1-13. Huber further testified and introduced evidence that 
after he left the company he immediately had his wife return the built up cash value 
(approximately $14,000) of the $250,000 whole life policy to LFUSA because "It was theirs." 
Tr Vol. 7,p.1457, L. 8-p.1458, L. 20(emphasisadded);Ex. P-88. 
4 Tr Vol. 7, p. 1491, LL. 14-18. Huber also testified that theft could be "assumed when you 
put something in your name." Tr Vol. 4, p. 648, L. 25 - p. 649, L. 8. Yet, during the course of his 
employment at LFUSA, Huber routinely titled LFUSA property in his own name, later claiming 
it was a "mistake." See Ex. D-125 (Huber titled a company vehicle in his name); Exs. D-20 and 
D-21 at RM0002; Ex. D-22 at RM0054 (Huber received $2,000 value on a trade-in of an LFUSA 
company vehicle as a down payment on a personal vehicle). 
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2. A workforce planning review reveals a lack of formal communication 
structure and Huber's micromanagement of departments. 
In November of 2009, Leniger-Sherratt accompanied Dennis to Orofino, Idaho, as an 
introductory trip to LFUSA.5 Tr Vol. 7, p. 1270, L. 24 - p. 1271, L. 10. Following the visit 
Leniger-Sherratt recommended she conduct a workforce planning review of LFUSA. Id., 
p. 12 71, LL. 11-19. In March 2010, Lenig er-Sherratt and Dennis returned to LFUSA' s Orofino 
facility to conduct the review. Id., p. 1272, L. 9- p. 1275, L. 7. Leniger-Sherratt, over the 
suggestion of Huber that he be involved, privately interviewed LFUSA's department managers 
and people in key positions. Id, p. 1274, L. 20-p. 1275, L. 7. 
During their interviews with Leniger-Sherratt, LFUSA's managers reported that there 
was a lack of formal process for the entire team to get together and communicate as a group, a 
lack of departmental meetings, and confusion about the direction of the business. Id., p. 1275, 
L. 8 - p. 1276, L. 10. Management also reported that Huber micromanaged the departments, 
talked to individual members of the management group rather than the collective group, and did 
not allow the managers to manage their own areas ofresponsibility. Id. Huber's actions in 
jumping over department heads to talk directly to the staff was a frustration for all of the 
managers. Id., p. 1277, L. 23-p. 1278, L. 21; R 507, ,i,i 6 & 7. The feedback from the workforce 
planning review was the first sign to Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt that there was dysfunction 
5 Leniger-Sherratt was employed at Lightforce Australia Proprietary Limited as its Group 
General Manager. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1267, LL. 13-25. Leniger-Sherratt has served as Group General 
Manager since 2009. Id. As Group General Manager, Leniger-Sherratt is second in charge of 
Mr. Dennis's businesses. Id., p. 1269, L. 19 - p. 1270, L. 3. Leniger-Sherratt sat on the Board, 
and as part of that role developed the strategies for all of the businesses, including LFUSA. Id., 
p. 1270, LL. 4-23. 
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within LFUSA. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1152, LL. 3-16. Thereafter, Leniger-Sherratt collected the responses 
and developed a PowerPoint presentation. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1276, LL. 11-25; Ex. P-8. Leniger-
Sherratt and Dennis sat down with Huber, showed him the PowerPoint slide by slide, and 
provided Huber feedback with regard to the issues identified during the review, including the 
need for Huber to facilitate openness, transparency, and communication. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1152, L. 3 
- p. 1154, L. 5; Tr Vol. 7, p. 1276, L. 16 - p. 1278, L. 21. Leniger-Sherratt discussed with Huber 
the need for more routine communication between the United States and Australia. Tr Vol. 7, 
p. 1277, L. 12 -p. 1278, L. 21. Leniger-Sherratt also recommended that LFUSA hire a personal 
assistant/business manager to assist Huber in fulfilling his Vice Presidential responsibilities. 
Tr Vol. 6, p. ll 52, L. 17 - p. ll 53, L. 7; Tr Vol. 7, p. 1281, L. 15 - p. 1282, L. ll. Leniger-
Sherratt recommended the assistant/business manager's role would be to attend meetings and 
alleviate the need for micromanagement, as well as to assist Huber in report writing. Id. 
Huber appeared to take the information well, agreed to more routine communication, and 
agreed to hire a personal assistant/manager to assist him. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1283, L. 6 - p. 1284, L. 10. 
Huber even presented the outcome of the review to LFUSA's department managers during a 
meeting. Id., p. 1284, L. 11 - p. 1285, L. 8. Before Leniger-Sherratt and Dennis returned to 
Australia, LFUSA hired an individual named Jim Davis to assist Huber in fulfilling his 
obligations and objectives under his role. Tr Vol. 6, p. ll 52, L. 17 - p. ll 54, L. 5; Tr Vol. 7, 
p. 1281, L. 15 - p. 1282, L. ll; id., p. 1285, L. 9- p. 1286, L. 23. However, things did not 
change. Immediately after Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt returned to Australia, Huber rebuffed the 
offer of help and instead diverted Mr. Davis to an IT-focused role. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1154, LL. 6-15; 
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Tr Vol. 7, p. 1304, LL. 11-21. Huber did not incorporate any of the recommendations from the 
review. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1304, L. 22 - p. 1305, L. 12. After leaving Idaho, Leniger-Sherratt started 
receiving concerning messages, primarily from Coleman, who was LFUSA's finance manager at 
the time6, Jesse Daniels ("Daniels"), who was LFUSA's logistics and production manager, and 
Kyle Brown ("Brown"), who was LFUSA's sales and marketing manager. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1154, 
L. I 6 - p. JI 55, L. 2; Tr Vol. 7, p. I 287, L. 22 - p. 1288, L. 14. 
3. Huber fails to promote an open and transparent organization, hiding 
information that he did not feel reflected favorably on himself. 
As noted above, LFUSA's formal communication structure, as well as company-wide 
decision-making, occurred primarily during monthly telephonic Board meetings. Tr Vol. 5, 
p. 775, L. 23 - p. 776, L. 9; id., p. 779, LL. 15-24. When Huber was Vice President, LFUSA's 
department managers sent monthly reports regarding their departments to Huber and Coleman. 
Id., p. 775, L. 23 -p. 776, L. 11. The reports would then be consolidated and sent to the Board. 
Id. Lightforce had a policy of promoting an open and transparent workplace, a policy that had 
been communicated to Huber. Id., p. 774, LL. 8-20. Huber, however, did not promote an open 
and transparent workplace. Id., p. 774, L. 21 -p. 775, L. 22. Huber refused to allow Coleman to 
communicate with her financial counterpart in Australia. Id. Moreover, Huber routinely 
6 In 2007 LFUSA hired Coleman as a Finance Manager. Tr Vol. 5, p. 763, L. 13 - p. 764, 
L. 5; id., p. 765, LL. 4-22. Coleman reported directly to Huber. Id., p. 767, LL. 7-11. Almost 
immediately after being hired, Huber began making directives to Coleman that Coleman felt 
were unethical. Id., p. 767, L. 22 - p. 77 I, L. 17. Huber's unethical directives included minor 
abuses of authority (i.e., directing Coleman to issue checks for invoices over and above Huber's 
$25,000 capital expenditure limitation) to falsifying reports to the Board. Id., p. 767, L. 22 -
p. 768, L. 21. 
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instructed Coleman to make changes to monthly Board reports materially misleading the Board 
members by not providing them with the full picture and hiding potentially serious production 
and process issues at LFUSA. Id., p. 776, LL. 12-14. Huber routinely directed Coleman to 
remove information regarding lead times, scraps and rejects, and the economy. Id., p. 776, 
L. 25 - p. 778, L. 4.7 On occasion, Mr. Huber would hand Coleman a red pen, sit over her 
shoulder, and direct her to cross out information in the reports. Id., p. 780, L. 15 - p. 781, L. 3; 
id., p. 783, L. 22 - p. 784, L. 4; Ex. D-38. The ultimate report to the Board would exclude the 
information Huber directed Coleman to remove. Compare Ex. D-38 (Board reports received by 
managers) to Ex. D-40 (final report sent to Board). Thereafter, during monthly conference calls 
to the Board, Huber would direct Coleman not to answer direct questions from the Board by 
muting the phone or putting his hand up in front of Coleman's face. Tr Vol. 5, p. 785, L. 2-
p. 786, L. 6. 
Huber did not maintain his focus and business interests in LFUSA's growth, ordering 
managers to ship to plan to keep down Dennis' s expectations about the potential growth of the 
company. Daniels, who was then LFUSA's logistics and production manager responsible for 
overseeing shipping and production, Tr Vol. 6, p. 1063, L. 7-p. 1066, L. 18, testified that near 
7 Lead times calculate the time between LFUSA's receipt of a customer order and its delivery 
of the product ordered to the customer. Tr Vol. 5, p. 778, L. 23 - p. 779, L. 1. Lead times are 
important because they signify the demand for LFUSA's product as compared to the capacity 
that LFUSA has to build product that is in demand. Id., p. 779, LL. 2-11. Scraps (e.g., product 
loss due to an employee scratching a lens) could signify either a process issue or a training issue 
that needed to be addressed. Id., p. 777, L. 14 - p. 778, L. 4. Similarly, rejects could signify a 
process issue, such as failing to conduct a full inspection prior to sending a product off to the 
production line for modification. Id. 
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the end ofLFUSA's fiscal year 2009, he reported projections to Huber concerning production 
numbers. Id., p. 1069, L. 25 - p. 1071, L. 6. LFUSA was running close to budget. Id., p. 1070, 
LL. 14-22. Huber instructed Daniels to quit shipping. Id. Huber told Daniels that "we'd done a 
good job and that, you know, if we exceeded budget, then the board and the owner would expect 
more out of us the following year." Id., p. 1070, L. 16 - p. 1071, L. 6. The same scenario played 
out at the end of fiscal year 2010. Id. 8 
4. Huber lies to the Board, then continues to deceive the Board by directing 
senior staff to falsify records. 
LFUSA's fiscal year ended June 30, 2010. In preparation for the year-end Board meeting 
to be held on July 28, 2010, Coleman created a report showing that backorders (open sales/ 
were approximately $2.4 million for Lightforce's fiscal year ending June 30, 2010. Tr Vol. 5, 
p. 792, L. 1 - p. 793, L. 9; Ex. D-63. Coleman and LFUSA's Director of Sales and Marketing, 
Brown, then shared that information with Huber. Id. Huber indicated that the $2.4 million in 
backorders would not be reported to the Board, but that backorders should be reported at a 
substantially lesser figure. Id., p. 795, LL. 4-16. Following Huber's comments, Coleman became 
very concerned that Huber was going to falsify LFUSA's backorder report to the Board. Id., 
8 Huber's directions to only "ship to plan" were corroborated by Coleman, who testified 
Huber would instruct the production and shipping departments to stop shipping product if 
LFUSA was coming in around budget. Tr Vol. 5, p. 771, LL. 4-17. Huber would inform Coleman 
that if LFUSA shipped more than budget (i.e., LFUSA's production was growing), it would only 
cause more work in the following year to show growth to the owner (Dennis). Id. 
9 LFUSA' s system, called Oracle, reports all orders that are entered into the system. 
Backorders are those orders that are entered into the system that LFUSA has not yet invoiced and 
shipped out to the customer. Tr Vol. 5, p. 799, L. 21-p. 800, L. 1. 
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p. 796, LL. 10-19. Coleman testified that falsifying the report "could hide a serious issue, and in 
our case it was hiding the fact that we had a serious capacity issue. We had $2.4 million in open 
orders, and it was going to increase our lead times. And we needed to increase our capacity in 
order to keep up with the demand for our product." Id., p. 799, LL. 6-16. Concerned for her 
integrity and job, Coleman called Leniger-Sherratt and apprised Leniger-Sherratt of her 
concerns. Id., p. 796, L. 20 - p. 797, L. 4. Coleman expressed to Leniger-Sherratt that she was 
very concerned that Huber would retaliate against her if he found out she was communicating 
with Leniger-Sherratt. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1291, L. 25 -p. 1292, L. 17. Separately, Brown also reached 
out to Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt. Ex. D-64. Both Coleman and Brown expressed their concern 
ofretaliation to Leniger-Sherratt. Ex. D-64; Tr Vol. 5, p. 796, L. 20- p. 797, L. 4. 
On July 28, 2010, the Board meeting was held and Coleman and Huber attended via 
telephone conference from Orofino. Tr Vol. 5, p. 790, L. 13 - p. 791, L. 10. Leniger-Sherratt and 
Dennis were also present in Orofino. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1290, LL. 8-21. Brown attended via 
teleconference from Georgia, and the remaining Board members were in Australia. Id. During 
the July 28, 2010 Board meeting, "[t]he question was asked specifically of Mr. Huber of what 
our back order situation was, at the financial yearend on the 30th of June, 2010, and he told the 
board and Ray Dennis it was $1.1 million." 10 Id., p. 1290, L. 25-p. 1291, L. 5. 
10 Backorders of $2.4 million indicate a serious capacity issue and have a direct negative 
effect on lead times. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1300, LL. 9-19; Tr Vol. 5, p. 779, LL. 2-7. Backorders of this 
magnitude indicate that LFUSA needed to increase capacity in order to keep up with the demand 
for product. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1300, L. 20- p. 1301, L. 14. 
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Following the Board meeting, Leniger-Sherratt discussed Huber's misreporting, as well 
as her concern that Huber might retaliate against Coleman and Brown, with Dennis and Dennis 
requested Leniger-Sherratt give Huber an opportunity to explain the backorder situation when 
Huber traveled to Australia the next month. Id., p. 1292, L. 18 -p. 1293, L. 15. Leniger-Sherratt 
contacted Geoff Inglis, who is the financial independent Board member in Australia, and Inglis 
developed a simple spreadsheet as a template to be given to Huber and Coleman to fill out. Id. 
Leniger-Sherratt requested that Huber and Coleman run the Oracle reports from May 2009, all 
the way through to June 2010 (the end of the fiscal year), and enter the reported number of open 
sales for each month. Id., p. 1293, L. 16 - p. 1294, L. 14. Coleman filled out the spreadsheet 
using the Oracle reports, which calculated open orders (backorders) of approximately 
$2,320,000. Tr Vol. 5, p. 808, L. 22 - p. 809, L. 2; Tr Vol. 7, p. 1296, LL. 9-18; Ex. D-67. 
Coleman shared the completed spreadsheet (Ex. D-67) with Huber. Tr Vol. 5, p. 809, LL. 3-8. 
Instead of reporting accurate information, Huber instructed Coleman to falsify the spreadsheet 
regarding the history of open orders in order to further perpetrate his fraud on the Board. Id., 
p. 809, LL. 9-21; id., p. 810, LL. 1-14. Coleman prepared a falsified spreadsheet at Huber's 
direction. Id.; Ex. D-68. Huber instructed Coleman to send the altered spreadsheet (Ex. D-68) to 
the Board in advance of Huber's trip to Australia. Tr Vol. 5, p. 810, LL. 15-21. Although neither 
Huber nor Coleman realized it at the time, the altered spreadsheet reflected negative open orders. 
Ex. D-68. (As Coleman later testified, "It is impossible to have negative unfulfilled orders." 
Tr Vol. 5, p. 811, LL. 1-23.) 
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On August 10, 2010, Leniger-Sherratt received the altered spreadsheet. Tr Vol. 7, 
p. 1292, L. 25 -p. 1295, L. 16; Ex. D-68; Ex. P-17 at 3. The alterations were so significant that 
they resulted in negative numbers being reported in the outstanding orders column, which 
Leniger-Sherratt knew was illogical because it is not possible to have negative numbers for 
outstanding open sales. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1295, LL. 2-16. Leniger-Sherratt knew that the spreadsheet 
altered at Huber's direction was inaccurate. Coleman shared with Leniger-Sherratt another 
spreadsheet that showed the accurate figures, based on the Oracle reports, and showed that the 
backorder figure in June 2010 was, in fact, close to $2.4 million. Id., p. 1295, L. 17 - p. 1296, 
L. 18; Ex. D-67. Based on the information she had received, Leniger-Sherratt generated an e-mail 
report dated August 31, 2010, in anticipation of the September 1, 2010, Board meeting that 
Huber was set to attend in Australia in person. See Tr Vol. 7, p. 1306, L. 13 - p. 1307, L. 7; 
Ex. D-84. The August 31, 2010, report detailed Leniger-Sherratt's concerns regarding the 
"accuracy and transparency of the NFO Board Information submitted." Id. The report detailed 
key concerns that "the board is either not receiving accurate information or organizationally we 
have risks in certain areas" and specifically addressed Huber's directive to Coleman to alter the 
spreadsheet to support his prior false report to the Board. Ex. D-84. The report culminated in a 
recommendation that "we need to get to a point prior to [Huber] leaving to head back to the US 
that he does not have the authority over other managers so we can be confident of the 
information being reported." Id. at 2. 
Huber traveled to Australia and attended the September 1, 2010 Board meeting. Tr Vol. 7, 
p. 1297, L. 18 - p. 1298, L. 5. The Board communicated to Huber that the backorder figure 
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Huber had reported was incorrect, as was the spreadsheet, and provided Huber with an 
opportunity to explain. Id., p. 1308, L. 7 - p. 1309, L. 18. Huber did not explain. Instead, Huber 
blamed Coleman and indicated that Coleman must have made a mistake. Id. 11 At that meeting, 
the Board discussed with Huber their plans to restructure LFUSA, removing Huber as Vice 
President and instead creating a group of equal managers who would run LFUSA and report to 
the Board. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1310, LL. 11-24. Per Huber's request, Dennis agreed to let Huber report 
to LFUSA that it was his decision to step down as Vice President and become an equal manager. 
Tr Vol. 6, p. 1158, L. 5 -p. 1162, L. 21. Dennis agreed to let Huber report that the organizational 
restructuring was Huber's idea because Dennis wanted the transition to work, wanted to ensure 
that Huber did not lose respect from his team members, and wanted to give Huber an opportunity 
to put his best foot forward with his new role. Id. That decision was communicated to LFUSA in 
an e-mail dated September 30, 2010. Ex. P-16. Per the e-mail, the managers were directed-
effective immediately-to provide their Board reports directly to the Board through Leniger-
Sherratt. The e-mail advised that LFUSA would be seeking to appoint a consultant to facilitate 
the transition to a management group. 
5. LFUSA creates the Operations Management Group (OMG). 
The decision to create a management group was formalized, and Dennis and Leniger-
Sherratt created what is referred to as the Operations Management Group (the "OMG"). 
11 Following the Board meeting, Huber returned to Orofino and instructed Coleman that she 
needed to tell the Board that the actual open orders were presales for July, and the majority of 
those open orders happened in the last two weeks of June. Tr Vol. 5, p. 812, LL. 3-25. About a 
week later, Huber instructed Coleman that she needed to tell the Board that she made a mistake. 
Id. 
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Tr Vol. 7, p. 1316, L. 11 - p. 1318, L. 7. LFUSA created the OMG to develop an organizational 
program to transition Huber from Vice President to an equal member of management, with all 
the OMG members working together. Id., p. 1315, LL. 13-25. At this time Lightforce removed 
Huber from his position as Vice President and demoted him to the position of Director of the 
Research & Development ("R&D") Group, a member of LFUSA's newly-created OMG. 12 
Tr Vol. 7, p. 1315, LL. 5-25; Ex. P-16. In November 2010, LFUSA hired a high-level consultant, 
William Barkett ("Barkett"), to facilitate Huber's transition from Vice President to manager as 
well as to get the team working effectively. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1318, L. 1; id., p. 1378, L. 21 - p. 1379, 
L. 16. Despite all LFUSA' s efforts and expense, Leniger-Sherratt continued to receive negative 
feedback from the United States. The team reported that Huber continued to act as a Vice 
President as opposed to an equal peer of the other OMG members. Tr Vol. 5, p. 813, L. 21 -
p. 814, L. 22. One of the first things Huber did after the OMG was formed was to make the 
unilateral decision to hire an employee without the OMG's input. Id., p. 814, LL. 18-22. Huber 
obstructed the OMG's efforts to implement business decisions that were going to grow the 
company and increase profitability. Id., p. 814, LL. 5-8; Tr Vol. 7, p. 1325, L. 20- p. 1327, 
L. 25 .13 Huber continued to act in a rude and hostile demeanor to the other members of the 
12 The OMG originally consisted of Huber (R&D), Brown (Sales & Marketing), Coleman 
(Finance Manager), Scott Peterson (Materials Manager), and Daniels (Production & Supply 
Manager). Debbi Duffy (HR Advisor) was later added to the OMG. In addition, Mark Cochran 
replaced Scott Peterson as Materials Manager on the OMG. See generally, Tr Vol. 5, p. 813, 
LL. 4-17; id, p. 852, LL. 1-18. 
13 Following Huber's notice of termination and removal from active employment, LFUSA 
implemented UPC coding, began selling to Cabela's and generated over $4 million in sales. 
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OMG. Huber even continued to hold himself out to the public using the title "Vice President" 
until May 2011, in violation of clear directives from the Board. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1327, LL. 15-25. 
6. Huber executes the NDA. 
In February of 2011, Leniger-Sherratt and Dennis were required to fly back to the United 
States to conduct a performance review of Huber. Id, p. 1329, LL. 4-15. During the February 
2011 review, Leniger-Sherratt discussed with Huber "the fact that he was still micromanaging 
other departments." 14 Tr Vol. 7, p. 1331, LL. 1-10. Dennis made very clear to Huber during the 
conversation that this transition had to work and that he was running out of options with regard 
to Huber's employment. Tr Vol. 6, p. I 160, LL. 10-22. 
Separately, during the February 2011 meeting the issue of Huber's execution of an NDA 
came up. Prior to returning to the United States, Leniger-Sherratt had requested Coleman to 
provide her with copies of everybody's signed ND As. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1334, L. I 0- p. 1335, L. 14. 15 
Leniger-Sherratt testified that having ND As with key employees was essential to protect 
LFUSA also saved $1 million by implementing a new process whereby LOW Japan replaced 
components in products before shipping the products to LFUSA. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1325, L. 20-
p. 1327, L. 14. 
14 Leniger-Sherratt also told Huber that his management style was not a good fit with the 
company; that Huber had an intimidating style, needed to let go of control, needed to trust other 
employees, and needed to let the managers manage their own departments; and that Huber's 
management style could not continue going in the same direction. Tr Vol. 4, p. 667, L. 17 -
p. 669, L. 13. 
15 In 2008, Leniger-Sherratt communicated with Huber that every LFUSA employee, 
including Huber, was required to have an NDA in place. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1332, LL. 3-18; Ex. D-26. 
Given that this was a directive from the Board, Leniger-Sherratt believed that Huber had 
obtained the requisite NDAs and had in fact signed one himself. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1333, LL. 3-12. 
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LFUSA's business interests in its intellectual property and confidential information. Id., p. 1333, 
LL. 13-19; id., p. 1336, L. 19-p. 1337, L. 2. Coleman advised Leniger-Sherratt that there was no 
NDA signed by Huber or Brown. Id., p. 1334, LL. 10-25. When Leniger-Sherratt met with 
Huber, Huber advised Leniger-Sherratt that he had signed an NDA, which was a direct lie. Id., 
p. 1336, LL. 1-14. Leniger-Sherratt required Huber to sign an NDA in her presence, which he 
did. Id., p. 1336, L. 19-p. 1337, L. 14; Ex. D-132. After Huber signed the NDA (Ex. D-132), 
Leniger-Sherratt reviewed the NDA and realized that a large portion of the NDA had been 
altered or removed from the original NDA, primarily as it related to noncompetition. Tr Vol. 7, 
p. 1337, L. 23 - p. 1341, L. 17. When confronted, Huber indicated that he had sought legal 
advice and was advised the NDA (Ex. D-132) was not enforceable. Id. Leniger-Sherratt then 
required Huber to execute a different NDA. Ex. P-22. The NDA provided in pertinent part that 
unless Huber was terminated for "performance related issues" or "summary dismissal," LFUSA 
would pay him an amount equal to his last annual base salary if he did not compete with LFUSA 
or obtain other employment for 12 months after the termination of his employment. Ex. P-22. 
Between February 2011 and May 2011, Huber's department, R&D, was not getting as 
much project work completed as had been hoped. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1343, LL. 1-18. In April 2011, 
LFUSA removed military sales from Huber's responsibilities, consolidating military sales with 
the Georgia sales team. Id., p. 1343, L. 19-p. 1344, L. 14. Leniger-Sherratt directed Huber to 
forward his military contacts to the LFUSA employee to whom military sales had been assigned. 
Id., p. 1344, LL. 2-9. Huber did not send the information through and in May Leniger-Sherratt 
made it a Board directive. Id., p. 1344, LL. 9-14. 
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At the end of May of 2011, Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt were required to make yet 
another change to Huber's employment status. Id, p. 1344, L. 15 - p. 1345, L. 23. Leniger-
Sherratt and Dennis were forced to make a second trip to the United States in less than three (3) 
months to meet with Huber to discuss Huber's future role with LFUSA. During their May 2011 
meeting, Leniger-Sherratt and Dennis advised Huber that they were removing Huber from the 
OMG and removing his responsibility for military sales and quality assurance. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1160, 
L. 10 - p. 1162, L. 24; Ex. P-23. It was clear that Huber's role on the OMG was not working. Id 
Huber was still trying to micromanage. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1344, L. 15 -p. 1345, L. 2. He was still 
interfering in the other managers' teams by going over the managers' heads and talking directly 
to their staff. Id LFUSA still wasn't getting the focus on R&D products that LFUSA wanted. Id., 
p. 1345, LL. 8-23. Dennis, Leniger-Sherratt and Huber discussed restructuring Huber's role 
purely into a R&D director role, removing him from the OMG. Id., p. 1345, LL. 13-23; Ex. P-23. 
During that meeting, Leniger-Sherratt and Dennis discussed with Huber an opportunity for 
Huber to take two months off to give the OMG members and Huber a break. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1347, 
LL. 6-21. 
In June of 2011, while Huber was on a two-month leave, Borkett facilitated an OMG 
meeting. Tr Vol. 5, p. 816, L. 8 - p. 818, L. 15; Tr Vol. 7, p. 1347, L. 6 - p. 1348, L. 5. At the 
meeting, the members of the OMG expressed strong concerns about Huber coming back to the 
companyinanyactiverole. Tr Vol. 5,p. 816, L. 8-p. 818, L. 15. TheseniormembersofOMG 
were unanimous in their decision that they did not want Huber to come back to work at 
Lightforce. Id., p. 816, L. 11-p. 817, L. 4. A number of the managers reported that they would 
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seek other employment if Huber returned to work at LFUSA. Id The issue was so serious that 
Borkett facilitated a call to Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt. Id, p. 817, LL. 8-21. During the call, 
the OMG members expressed their fear about Huber returning to LFUSA in any role. Tr Vol. 7, 
p. 1348, LL. 10-17; Tr Vol. 5,p. 817, L. 22-p. 818, L. 1; id,p. 818, L. 16-p. 819, L. 24. The 
managers informed Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt that they would rather seek alternate 
employment than work with Huber in any capacity. Id. 16 
The news was so significant that Leniger-Sherratt and Dennis made immediate plans to 
go back to the United States to meet with the OMG face to face. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1348, LL. 18-22. 
On July 28, 2011, Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt made a third trip to the United States to address 
issues concerning Huber's performance. Tr Vol. 5, p. 818, L. 16 - p. 819, L. 16; Tr, Vol. 7, 
p. 1390, L. 21 - p. 1391, L. 9. Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt held an offsite meeting with Borkett, 
Debbie Duffy, Mark Cochran, Daniels and Coleman. Tr Vol. 5, p. 818, L. 16 - p. 819, L. 16. 
Many of the senior members of the OMG expressed that they would seek other employment if 
Huber returned to active employment. See Id, p. 816, L. 11-p. 817, L. 4; Tr Vol. 7, p. 1350, 
L. 1 2 - p. 13 5 2, L. 9; id, p. 13 51, LL. 17-21. These managers also informed Dennis and Leniger-
Sherratt about their concerns regarding a number of issues pertaining to Huber's performance, 
including Huber's request of a subordinate to purchase marijuana while at work, rumors 
16 Similarly, Kevin Stockdill expressed his concern that should Huber return to R&D, he was 
fearful that the other employees of that department (Huber's subordinates) would leave, which 
would set back the department at least five years. Tr Vol. 5, p. 882, L. 19 - p. 884, L. 1. 
Stockdill's fear was corroborated by the employees in R&D, Klaus Johnson and Corey Runia, 
who each testified, by way of declaration, that they had told Stockdill they would rather quit than 
work with Huber. R 526, § 9; R 533. 
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concerning Huber's falsification of a urine sample in order to fraudulently obtain insurance, his 
non-compliance with LFUSA's Federal Fire Arm ("FFA") licensing requirements, as well as his 
directive to ship scopes to Australia without the appropriate quality assurance. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1351, 
L. 16 - p. 1352, L. 9; id, p. 1352, LL. 10-18. Dennis was shocked and extremely disappointed 
about the news, given his long-term relationship with Huber. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1166, L. 13 - p. 1167, 
L. 10. Leniger-Sherratt testified that following reflection back on all the actions LFUSA had 
taken, all the changes they had made, on Huber's behavior and inability to assimilate or work 
effectively as a team member, Leniger-Sherratt and Dennis "ultimately decided that there was no 
other option other than to terminate Mr. Huber's employment." Tr Vol. 7, p. 1353, L. 3 - p. 1354, 
L. 3. Likewise, Dennis testified that the "ramifications of that was that we determined after going 
around the table and reconfirming that there was no more room for negotiation that I could do on 
behalf of Mr. Huber's return; that he had to be terminated. There was no way we could avoid 
that." Tr Vol. 6, p. 1167, LL. 11-17. 
7. Huber's active employment duties end on August 2, 2011, and Huber is given 
12 months' notice of termination with pay. 
Following the July 28,201 I meeting, Dennis did not decide to make a change to Huber's 
employment with LFUSA, Huber has represented on appeal-Dennis made the decision to 
terminate Huber's employment. Id, p. 1167, LL. 11-17. In fact, Huber testified that during a 
phone call preceding an in-person meeting Dennis told Huber that he was terminating Huber's 
employment. Tr Vol. 2, p. 373, L. 10-p. 375, L. 18. Specifically, Huber testified: 
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But I asked him, I said, so you're saying there's no place/or me to build scopes 
at Nightforce at all or no place for me in Nightforce, and I can't build scopes 
anymore? He said, that's right. 
Id, p. 374, L. 22- p. 375, L. I (emphasis added). 
Thereafter, Borkett, Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt went to Huber's home and explained to 
Huber that they were terminating his employment for unsatisfactory performance. Tr Vol. 6, 
p. 1171, LL. 8-10; Tr Vol. 7,p.1324, LL.1-2;Ex. P-31. Huberhimselftestifiedthathewas 
being "fired." See Tr Vol. 2, p. 377, LL. 12-18. Although not obligated to do so, Dennis offered 
Huber a 12-month notice agreement. See Ex. P-30. Pursuant to the notice agreement, LFUSA 
offered to continue to pay Huber his base pay and benefits ( other than vacation pay) during the 
12-month period between August 2, 2011 and August 1, 2012, with Huber's official termination 
date set at August 1, 2012. Id See also Ex. P-32 at NFO0687. Setting the termination date to 
August 1, 2012, as opposed to August 1, 2011, was intentional. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1354, L. 16-
p. 1355, L. 19. At that point in time, Dennis knew that Huber and his wife were trying to have a 
baby. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1168, L. 23 - p. 1169, L. 17. Thus, Huber and his wife remained covered by 
health insurance during the 12-month notice period. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1355, LL. 2-5; see also Tr 
Vol. 2, p. 3 79, L. 15 - p. 380, L. 18. Separately, Dennis testified that he offered Huber 12 months 
of pay because he wanted Huber to have an opportunity to find alternate employment, as well as 
an opportunity for a future relationship with Dennis so long as it was outside LFUSA. Tr Vol. 6, 
p. 1169, LL. 1-17. Huber's testimony at trial indicated that he understood the intent of the notice 
period. See Tr Vol. 2, p. 379, L. 15 - p. 380, L. 18. 
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It was made crystal clear to Huber that he would not be performing any further 
employment services for LFUSA. See Ex. P-30 at 1. 
You will not be active in your employment with NFO, any communication with 
NFO staff, suppliers, customers or interested parties shall be directed to the 
relevant NFO staff member responsible. 
You will relinquish any and all NFO owned property within 3 days of signing this 
agreement, this shall include any NFO owned IP/R&D files, inventions and/or 
any computer/cell phones and/or computer peripherals. 
You will be able to pick up any personal belongings from the office at a pre-
designated time within 3 days of signing this agreement. 
Ex. P-30 at 1. In the event Huber contravened the conditions, the benefits would cease. Id 
At the meeting, Huber requested that LFUSA document in writing the reasons for his 
termination. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1170, L. 13; id., p. 1176, L. 7. On August 3, 2011, during a second 
meeting with Huber, Dennis and Leniger-Sherratt provided Huber with the requested letter 
documenting the performance reasons for terminating Huber's employment at LFUSA. Tr Vol. 7, 
p. 1361, L. 10- p. 1362, L. 20; Ex. P-32. The August 3, 2011, letter gave three key examples of 
the performance-related reasons for plaintiffs termination. The reasons listed included: 
• The inability to promote an open and transparent organization regarding 
accurate reporting and factual information sharing with the Board - to the 
level where you instructed Senior staff to keep things "in-house" and directed 
them to change information before it was submitted to the Board, in complete 
contravention to the requests and direction given. 
• The fact that you advised the Board in June 2010 there was approximately 
$1 .4M in backorders when there was in fact over $2.4M - and an instruction 
given to the Finance Manager around that time to change figures in a 
spreadsheet to reflect your initial advice. 
• The behaviour you have displayed and the anxiousness that behaviour created 
for a significant number of NFO staff, from management to shop floor 
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personnel, has resulted in no option but to exit you from NFO. NFO had been 
put in a position where we were at risk of losing a large number of very key 
personnel in the event that your employment was continued. This is as a direct 
result of your management style, demeanour and the way you treated some 
members of the staff. 
Id. at NFO0686. 
At this second meeting, Huber asked Dennis what the termination meant to the benefits 
under his CSO. Dennis told Huber-at that August 2011 meeting-that his benefits were 
forfeited. Tr Vol. 6, p. 1172, LL. 5-13. Huber never performed another employment service for 
LFUSA. Tr Vol. 4, p. 628, L. 5 - p. 629, L. 5. During the 12-month notice period that Huber was 
uninvolved in the company, LFUSA implemented the changes that Huber so vehemently 
opposed. Coleman testified that during that 12-month period: 
We've grown the company from around approximately 63 employees to 110, 
approximately. We've added a second shift in production, a second shift in the 
machine shop. From that fiscal year July 1, 2011, through June 30th, 2012, we 
grew sales by 58 percent. 
Tr Vol. 5, p. 820, LL. 6-14. 
Despite being told in August 2011 that (1) LFUSA was terminating Huber's employment 
for unsatisfactory performance, and (2) that his benefits under the CSO were forfeited as a result 
of his termination for unsatisfactory performance, Huber sought to value his alleged benefits 
under the CSO as of August 1, 2012, seeking to take advantage of significant growth during the 
12-month period when he was not even involved in LFUSA. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Held that the Amount Payable to Huber Pursuant to 
the NDA Was Not "Wages," as Defined by Idaho Code Section 45-601, and, 
Therefore, the $180,000 Judgment Awarded to Huber Should Not Be Trebled. 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] 
free review." Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 54 7, 548 (2006) ( citation omitted). "It must 
begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." Id. Claims for wages are 
governed by chapter 6 of Title 45, Idaho Code, which defines wages as "compensation for labor 
or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece or 
commission basis." IDAHO CODE§ 45-601(7) (emphasis added). "The statute does not define 
wages as including all forms of compensation." Paolini, 143 Idaho at 549; see also Moore v. 
Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809 (2005) ( a claim for "future wages" due to breach of employment 
contract provision requiring payment for termination of employment without cause is not a claim 
for "wages" subject to trebling under Idaho law); Whitlock v. Haney Seed Co., 114 Idaho 628, 
630-35 (Ct. App. 1988) (court did not treble damages for "the loss of future wages" due to a 
breach of an employment contract requiring good cause for termination of employment). 
Section 3 of the NDA 17 at issue in the case at bar (Ex. P-22) bears the heading "NON 
COMPETITION." Id. at NF00341-42. Subsection 3.1 contains a 12-month post employment 
17 Huber insists that the NDA is an "Employment Contract," as if his mischaracterization of 
the nature of the agreement would render his damages award for breach of the NDA an award of 
"unpaid wages" that must be trebled under the Idaho Wage Claim Act, Idaho Code 
Sections 45-601 - 45-621. Appellant's Brief at 1, n.2. The NDA cannot properly be 
characterized as an employment contract. In both his Complaint and his Amended Complaint, 
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noncompetition clause, and Subsection 3.2 provides payment terms, including terms that provide 
for the cessation or reduction of any payment if Huber obtained alternative employment. Id. at 
NFO0341-42. As the trial court correctly held, Huber's recovery under the NDA does not 
represent "wages" under the Idaho Wage Claim Act because the amount of his recovery "was 
not earned in increments as services were performed nor paid as direct consideration for 
services rendered." R 677 ( emphasis added). 
This Court's holding in Moore, supra, supports the trial court's decision in the case at 
bar. In Moore, the plaintiff-employee (Moore) and the defendant Omnicare, Inc. (Omnicare) 
entered into an employment agreement with a five-year term of employment. 141 Idaho at 812-
13. The agreement provided that if Omnicare terminated Moore's employment "without cause" 
prior to the end of the five-year term, Omnicare would pay Moore's base salary to him for the 
remainder of the five-year term. 141 Idaho at 813. Omnicare terminated Moore's employment 
before the end of the term. 141 Idaho at 814. An arbitration panel awarded $247,500 in damages 
to Moore for breach of the employment agreement but refused to treble the damage award, and 
the district court affirmed the panel's decision. Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed the district 
court's holding that the damages awarded to Moore were part of a liquidated damages provision 
in his employment agreement, were not compensation for services rendered, and therefore should 
Huber himself called the document the "Noncompetition Agreement." [See, e.g., R 20, 1 12; 
R 197, 128]. The document's actual title is "Deed of Non Disclosure, Non Competition and 
Assignment," not "Employment Contract" or "Employment Agreement." The NDA was simply 
"a term of the employment contract between [Huber] and [LFUSA]." Ex. P-22 at NFO0344, 
§ 14.1 (emphasis added). 
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not be trebled. 141 Idaho at 819-20. Citing to Whitlock v. Haney Seed Co., 114 Idaho 628, 633 
(Ct. App. 1988), the Court concluded that "Moore's damages most closely resemble a claim for 
'future wages"' which do not fall within the purview of the mandatory trebling statute." Id 
This Court's ruling in Moore, and the rationale and authority underlying that ruling, fully 
support the district court's decision in the case at bar that any amount due Huber under the NDA 
was not a "wage." Huber's claim is no different from Moore's claim. Each of them has argued in 
effect that he was entitled to payment of his annual base salary on termination of his 
employment, as bargained for consideration under an employment agreement, if his employment 
was terminated without cause. 18 Under Huber's own view of the case, the judgment he recovered 
was not compensation for services rendered, but liquidated damages due and owing in the event 
LFUSA summarily dismissed Huber or terminated Huber's employment for substandard 
performance. 19 Moreover, no payment due under the NDA is labeled as or can properly be 
described as a "severance payment." As this Court stated in Parker v. Underwriters 
Laboratories, Inc., 140 Idaho 517, 520 (2004 ), upon which Huber relies, "'Severance pay' has 
been defined as ' [a] sum of money usually based on length of employment for which an 
employee is eligible upon termination."' (Citation omitted.) Unlike a true severance payment, 
18 The concept of cause is inherent in the plain, ordinary meaning of the term "substandard 
performance." See Whitlock v. Haney Seed Co., 114 Idaho 628, 632 (Ct. App. 1988) (there is no 
"genuine difference" between "good cause" and "unsatisfactory performance."). 
19 The Idaho Wage Claim Act requires employers to pay all wages due to an employee "at 
least once during each calendar month," IDAHO CODE § 45-608( I), and "upon separation from 
employment," IDAHO CODE § 45-606. The Act provides no cause of action/or any payment that 
is due to a former employee after termination of employment. Such a payment would constitute 
"future wages," which cannot be trebled under the Idaho Wage Claim Act. 
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any payment due Huber under the NDA was not based on the length of his employment, and 
Huber was not eligible for payment upon termination of his employment as he would have been 
if the payment were severance. As the trial court correctly held, any payment due Huber under 
the NDA was subject to reduction or total loss if Huber competed with LFUSA or obtained other 
employment during the 12 months after the termination of his employment with LFUSA. 
R 1982.20 As shown by Huber's own citation of authority, no payment under the NDA could be 
wages or severance pay because the payment was not consideration for Huber's labor or services 
as an employee. See Parker, 140 Idaho at 522 ("severance payments" given as consideration for 
release were not wages even though they were based in part on employee's salary and length of 
service); see also Stevenson v. Branch Banking & Trust Corp., 861 A.2d 735, 749 (Md. App. 
2004) (where termination compensation was payment for employee's covenant not to compete 
with employer after termination of employment, employee could not possibly perform all the 
work necessary to earn the termination compensation until after her employment ended, and 
termination compensation therefore did not constitute "wages" under the Maryland Wage 
Payment and Collection Law); Gilliam v. Nev. Power Co., 488 F.3d 1189, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 
20 Huber never testified that the NDA was a "severance agreement." He testified that he 
understood the NDA required him not to compete with LFUSA for 12 months after his 
employment ended and required him not to disclose LFUSA's confidential information. 
Tr Vol. 4, p. 658, LL. 4-15. Huber also never argued to the trial court that payment under the 
NDA was not contingent upon his compliance with the noncompetition provisions of the 
agreement. "The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised 
for the first time on appeal." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343 (2008). In fact, he argued 
to the contrary. Tr Vol. 1, p. 20, LL. 19-22. (Huber's counsel states: "That's what this [NDA] is 
for, to compensate him for the years or services provided he doesn't compete .... ") ( emphasis 
added). 
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2007) ("[S]everance pay was not for services, but for [plaintiffs] voluntary termination of 
employment, confidentiality, non-competition, and waiver of claims against Nevada Power 
Company."). 
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Award Huber Prejudgment Interest 
before August 1, 2013. 
"[P]rejudgment interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or readily 
ascertainable by mathematical process." Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho 274 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal 
citation omitted). "[D]amages are unascertainable where some factor necessary to calculate the 
amount of damages must be determined by a trier of fact." Id A trial court's order regarding 
prejudgment interest is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Id ( citations omitted). In his 
claim for breach of the NDA, Huber pled that he had been "damaged in an amount to be proved 
at trial, but not less than the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000)." R 197, 
,i 32. Up until trial, the parties disputed Huber's base salary, a fact admitted by Huber. See Tr 
Vol. 1, p. 20, LL. 1-8 (Huber's counsel stated: "We believe the 200,000 or the last year of wages 
that he would get under that non-competition agreement are justly due to him .... We may have 
a fight over what the salary was as that last year of employment. Was it 180,000? Was it 
200,000?"). Moreover, as the trial court correctly held, any payment due Huber under the NDA 
was subject to reduction or total loss if Huber competed with LFUSA or obtained other 
employment during the 12 months after the termination of his employment with LFUSA. R 1982. 
Because the trial court needed to resolve the issue of the amount of Huber's base salary, the 
amount awarded Huber was subject to dispute, not liquidated or readily ascertainable by 
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mathematical process prior to trial, and, therefore, Huber is not entitled to additional 
prejudgment interest. 
C. The District Court Correctly Held that the CSO Was a "Top Hat Plan" Under 
29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) and Not Subject to ERISA's Vesting/Anti-Forfeiture Provision 
(29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1061) or Funding Provision (29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086) Because It 
Was Not Funded. 
A Top Hat plan is defined under ERISA's statutory scheme as: "A plan which is 
unfunded and maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred 
compensation for a select group of management or highly compensated employees." These plans 
are statutorily exempt from the participation, vesting, funding and fiduciary provisions of 
ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 108l(a)(3) & l lOl(a)(l). "The failure ofERISA to provide 
nonforfeitability coverage to top hat plans is not an 'interstice' because it is the result of a 
deliberate decision to let executives use their positions of power to negotiate such protection for 
their plans on their own." Bigda v. Fischbach Corp., 898 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), 
aff'd, 101 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 1996). 
Huber does not challenge the trial court's determination that the CSO was offered only to 
management and highly-compensated employees. 21 Instead, Huber contends that the CSO was 
"funded" and therefore fails to meet the statutory definition of a Top Hat plan. Here, the trial 
court concluded: 
21 Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374 (2010) (this court will not consider an issue that is not 
supported by argument and authority in the opening brief). In fact, Huber pied both that he was a 
member of management and a highly compensated employee and that the primary purpose of the 
CSO was to provide compensation to Huber. R 201, ,r,r 58-59. 
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The CSO was not funded. LFUSA did take out a one million dollar life insurance 
policy on Huber. If he passed away half of the proceeds would go to LFUSA and 
the other half to Huber's parents (later that beneficiary was changed to Huber's 
wife). The insurance policy was originally a term life policy. Later it was changed 
to part term life and part whole life. The policy was cancelled after Huber was 
terminated from employment. LFUSA ultimately received the cash value of the 
whole life portion of the policy. 
R 14 JO. The trial court's holding is supported by the weight of authorities addressing the issue. 
ERISA does not specify what requirements a plan must meet in order to be considered 
"unfunded." In fact, the term is somewhat of a misnomer because "[ a ]n employer may set aside 
deferred compensation amounts in a segregated fund or trust without jeopardizing a plan's 
'unfunded' status if the fund or trust remains 'subject to the claims of the employer's creditors in 
the event of insolvency or bankruptcy."' IT Grp., Inc. v. IT Litig. Trust, 448 F.3d 661,665 (3d 
Cir. 2006) ( citation omitted). Determination of the "funded" or "unfunded" status of a deferred 
compensation plan requires an examination of the surrounding facts and circumstances, 
including the plan's status under non-ERISA law. In re IT Grp., Inc., 305 B.R. 402,407. The 
existence of an ERIS A plan within the statutory definition is a mixed question of fact and law. 22 
Here, the trial court, weighing the credibility, testimony and evidence introduced at trial, held 
that the CSO was unfunded. Where the trial court based its finding on substantial evidence, even 
if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not overturn those findings on appeal. Benninger v. 
Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488-89 (2006). 
22 See, e.g., House v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443,449 (5th Cir. 2007) ("mixed 
question of fact and law"); Reliable Home Health Care, Inc. v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 295 F .3d 
505, 510 (5th Cir. 2002) ("existence of an ERISA plan is a question of fact" reviewed for clear 
error, but the "legal conclusions reached by the district court in applying those facts is [sic] 
de novo"). 
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In determining whether a corporate plan is "unfunded," the Department of Labor, the 
entity responsible for overseeing ERISA plan compliance, has indicated that in evaluating this 
question "great weight should be given to the tax consequences of such plans." Reliable Home 
Health Care v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 505, 513-14 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added); see also Miller v. Heller, 915 F. Supp. 651,659 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (a plan 
under which the beneficiaries do not incur tax liability during the year that the contributions 
to the plan are made is "more likely than not" an "unfunded" plan) ( emphasis added). 
LFUSA submits that the holding in In re Cheeks, 467 B.R. 136 (N.D. Ill. 2012), and the 
cases cited therein, directly refute Huber's contentions on appeal. In Cheeks, Mark Hulbert 
(Hulbert), a former executive, filed an adversary action claiming the loss of a retirement account 
he asserted he personally owned in the amount of $125,000. Cheeks, 467 B.R. at 150. The 
account was a deferred compensation trust account created in Hulbert and his business partner's 
names pursuant to a "Deferred Compensation Agreement" between Chicagoland Foods, Inc. and 
Hulbert. Id. Hulbert argued that because the company "set aside" funds in an account, naming 
Hulbert as a co-owner, the account was funded and therefore not a Top Hat plan. The bankruptcy 
court disagreed. Notably, the court concluded that "[ejven if it could be argued that the Trust 
funds in this case were segregated from [the Companies 'J general assets, Plaintiff still could 
not establish any proprietary interest in the Trust's funds because Plaintiff did not treat the 
funds as his property for tax purposes." In re Cheeks, 467 B.R. 136, 154 ( emphasis added). 
Citing to the leading authorities on the issue, the court in Cheeks explained: 
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Several courts to have considered the issue found it appropriate to consider the tax 
consequences of the deferred compensation plan at issue. See, e.g., IT Group, Inc., 
448 F.3d 661, 668-69 (3d Cir.2006); Reliable Home Health Care, Inc. v. Union 
Central Ins. Co., 295 F.3d 505 (5th Cir.2002). The Fifth Circuit Opinion quoted a 
holding by a District Court Judge in that Circuit, stating, "a 'plan is more likely 
than not to be regarded as unfunded if the beneficiaries under the plan do not 
incur tax liability during the year that the contributions to the plan are made. "' 
Reliable Home Health Care, Inc., 295 F3d at 514. The rationale for this test 
looks to basic tax rules. In general, when an employer exchanges assets with an 
employee in return for services, any assets received by the employee are taxed as 
income to the employee. Schroeder v. New Century Holdings, Inc., 387 B.R. 95, 
109 (Bankr.D.Del.2008) .•.• With "unfunded" plans, the employee is not taxed 
on the compensation until she or he actually receives the deferred amount 
because "the employee may never receive the money if the company becomes 
insolvent." IT Group, Inc., 448 F .3d 661, 665 (3d Cir.2006). This is because the 
funds are available to the creditors of the company. 
In re Cheeks, 467 B.R. 136, 154 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012) (emphasis added). Applying the 
foregoing standard, the court in Cheeks held that Hulbert's failure to pay taxes was "quite 
consistent with the conclusion that funds in that account were property of CFMC, not of the 
Plaintiff." Id. 
Huber fails to address these authorities on appeal. Presumably this is because of the fact 
that Huber admits he did not pay taxes on any benefit under the CSO. 23 Tr Vol. 4, p. 657, 
LL. 11-13. In addition to failing to address the authorities holding that the failure of the plaintiff 
to pay taxes makes the plan more likely than not unfunded, the primary authorities cited by 
Huber did not concern Top Hat plans.24 The main case relied on by Huber, Dependahl v. Falstaff 
23 Payment of life insurance premiums by an employer is taxable income to the employee in 
the year of the premium payment. See 26 C.F.R. § l.61-2(d)(2)(ii)(A) (life insurance premiums 
paid by an employer on the life of its employee are part of the gross income of the employee). 
24 Huber's reference to guaranteed benefit policies, as identified in John Hancock Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96, n.5, 114 S. Ct. 517 (1993), 
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Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 102 S. Ct. 512, 70 L. Ed. 2d 
384 (1981), 25 involved a welfare benefits plan (an entirely different category of ERISA plan) that 
provided life insurance to a designated beneficiary for select employees. Less than eight years 
later the same court that issued the Dependahl opinion clarified its earlier holding and found that 
a salary continuance agreement, which provided retirement, disability and death benefits, 
constituted an unfunded excess benefit plan under ERISA. Belsky v. First Nat 'l Life Ins. Co., 818 
F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1987). The court in Belsky relied on the holding in Belka v. Rowe Furniture 
Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1249 (1983). In Belka, the court held that a plan is "unfunded," where a life 
insurance policy would fund the employer's liability only in the rare instance of death and the 
company would ordinarily pay the benefits out of its general assets in the event ofretirement or 
termination of employment. 571 F. Supp. at 1252. 
It is undisputed that the CSO-like the plan in Belka-references life insurance only in 
the event of an employee death or disability, contemplating that in the more likely scenario of 
retirement or separation from service benefits would be paid from the general assets of LFUSA. 
Huber admitted as much in his briefing before the Court. See R 230 ("Sources of financing are 
identified for various scenarios. In the event LUSA was sold, the proceeds of the sale would be 
is a red herring. Guaranteed benefit policies are defined in 29 U.S.C. § l 10l(b)(2). The very first 
paragraph of section 1101 (like the majority ofregulatory provisions) statutorily exempts Top 
Hat plans from coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § l lOl(a)(l). 
25 Cf Demery v. Extebank Deferred Comp. Plan, 216 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2000) (life insurance 
contracts purchased by company to help pay for obligations under executive compensation plan 
did not render the plan "funded"); Reliable Home Health Care, Inc. v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 295 
F.3d 505,514 (5th Cir. July 10, 2002) (Top Hat plan found valid where benefits were funded and 
paid through whole life insurance policies). 
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the source of financing .... In the event of' [ d]eath, ill health or incapacitation of Huber, an 
insurance policy purchased by LUSA would be the source of financing .... In the event Huber 
retired or was terminated for some reason other than 'unsatisfactory performance', the source of 
financing was to be either shares or the general assets of LUSA.") (internal citations omitted). In 
addition, the fact that Huber returned or assigned the value of the benefit to LFUSA also 
demonstrates that Huber did not intend to look to a res separate from the general assets of 
LFUSA. Tr Vol. 7, p. 1457, L. 18-p. 1459, L. 4; Ex. P-88. Recently, in Precious Plate, Inc. v. 
Russell, No. 06-CV-546C, 2011 WL 3667663, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2011), the court found 
it dispositive that the participant had assigned his benefits under a life insurance policy to the 
corporation. In that case, as here, the plaintiff was the sole participant in a deferred compensation 
plan allegedly consisting of whole life insurance policies. Although the plan at issue did not 
contain specific language that the rights in the policy were those of an unsecured creditor, the 
court nonetheless found that the plan was an unfunded Top Hat plan. 
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Holding that Huber's Right to Goodwill Under the 
CSO Was Subject to Forfeiture. 
Huber's argument that the forfeiture clause is unenforceable because the benefits had 
been earned and were therefore "vested" is contrary to the law and is directly contradicted by 
Huber's own testimony at trial.26 "Since ERISA intentionally omits top hat plans from its 
nonforfeitability protection, federal common law may not be used to create nonforfeitability 
26 During trial Huber testified that he understood-when he signed the CSO-that if his 
employment was terminated for unsatisfactory performance he would forfeit any benefit under 
the CSO. See Tr Vol. 4, p. 653, L. 9 - p. 655, L. 8. 
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protection under ER1SA." Bigda v. Fischbach Corp., 898 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), 
aff'd, 101 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that there is a "strong public 
policy against forced forfeiture" as demonstrating "ignorance of the structure of ER1SA and the 
role of federal common law in cases governed by ER1SA"). See also Bryan v. Pep Boys-Manny, 
Moe & Jack, CIV.A. 00-1525, 2001 WL 752645 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2001) (rejecting "vesting 
argument" and holding Top Hat plan, under which executive earned benefits at two percent per 
year of participation, up to a maximum 25 years, was subject to forfeiture clause even after 
employee retires); United States v. Graham, 2007 WL 1806174 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (rejecting 
former executive's argument that the "bad boy" clause in his Top Hat plan was unenforceable 
because he had "vested," concluding that such an argument is stated without authority and runs 
contrary to the law). 
Huber's next argument, that forfeiture clauses are only enforceable where an employee 
competes or engages in illegal activity, is not supported by citation to a single authority and is 
inaccurate. See Howard v. Clyde Findlay Area Credit Union, Inc., 2013 WL 4784913, * 16 (N.D. 
Ohio 2013) (upholding forfeiture of an executive's Top Hat plan on a finding that the executive 
was terminated for cause). The executive in that case was terminated for cause following 
allegations he engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a human resources manager that led 
other employees to lose respect for the executive, creating a negative, distracting effect on the 
employer's day-to-day operations and establishing a negligent failure of the executive to perform 
his duties. 
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Finally, Huber's continued reliance on the 1984 decision rendered in Hollenbeck v. 
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Mo. 1984), is inappropriate. The decision in 
Hollenbeck was issued prior to enactment of the very provisions ofERISA that recognize an 
exception for Top Hat plans. As such, the court in Hollenbeck applied the federal common law as 
it existed pre-ERISA. Where application of the federal common law conflicts with Congress' 
statutory scheme concerning the forfeitability of Top Hat plans, it is of no effect. See Bigda, 898 
F. Supp. at 1016. Even if this Court were to look to Hollenbeck, Huber would still not prevail. 
Any question as to whether Huber's impropriety would breach the business sensibilities of a 
hypothetical "reasonable" businessman should be dispelled by the trial court's finding that: "The 
deceit on Huber's part amounts to willful misconduct, is a serious breach of company policy and 
procedure, and is fraudulent behavior." R 1415. 
E. The Trial Court Correctly Held that Huber's Benefits Under the CSO Were 
Forfeited. 
"A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary 
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal."). Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber 
Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 178 (2003). Huber fails to cite to a single excerpt from the record where 
he argued that his benefits should be awarded during periods of Huber's loyalty-assuming such 
periods could even be established. Separately, the only damages Huber sought at trial were 
damages based on a valuation date in 2012. See Tr Vol. 3, p. 528, L. 25 -p. 529, L. 18 (Huber's 
expert did not offer an opinion as to the amount of Huber's alleged damages if the valuation date 
were August 1, 2011, or alternatively, 2006). Huber's counsel admitted that they did not 
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introduce evidence of an alternate valuation. See Tr Vol. 7, p. 1553, LL. 20-22 ("Candidly, I 
don't think there is a specific line of testimony that says, well, I thought the equitable amount 
was X."). Nor may Huber ask this Court to reweigh the evidence of Huber's unsatisfactory 
performance. See IRCP 52(a); Benninger v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488-89 (2006); Rowley v. 
Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107 (1999); Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,643 (2006). 
F. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Concluding that Huber Failed to Adequately Plead 
a Cause of Action for Equitable Relief. 
In determining whether a plaintiff has adequately pied a right to equitable relief under 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), the plaintiff must have set forth the specific equitable reliefrequested. 
See Rucker v. Benesight Inc., 2006 WL 2472673 (D. Idaho 2006) (holding that the plaintiff must 
set forth what, if any, equitable relief he seeks in order to adequately place defendant on notice 
of an ERIS A claim for equitable relief). Huber did not seek equitable relief of any kind in his 
Complaint (R 18-26) or Amended Complaint (R 192-206). As the trial court correctly found, 
Huber did not try an equitable claim by implied or express consent of the parties. Huber fails to 
cite to any authority in support of his argument on appeal that the trial court erred. See Liponis v. 
Bach, 149 Idaho 3 72, 3 7 4 (2010) (this court will not consider an issue that is not supported by 
argument and authority in the opening brief). 27 
27 Nor could Huber have successfully amended his Complaint to add a claim for equitable 
relief. See 29 U.S.C. Section l 132(e), which is the ERISA provision regarding jurisdiction that 
provides, in relevant part: "Except for actions under subsection ( a)( 1 )(b) of this section, the 
district courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions brought under this 
subchapter .... State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of the United States 
shall have concurrent jurisdiction under paragraphs (1)(8) and (7) of subsection (a) of this 
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G. The Trial Court Correctly Held that LFUSA Was the Prevailing Party, Entitling 
LFUSA to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
The determination of prevailing party status is committed to the sound discretion of the 
district court. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 537 (2010). In determining which party 
prevailed and is entitled to attorney fees, the court is "allowed to consider the presence and 
absence of awards of affirmative relief and determine which party, on balance, prevailed in the 
action."28 Burns v. Cnty. of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623,626 (Ct. App. 1990), ajf'd, 120 Idaho 614 
(1991). The trial court awarded LFUSA $284,464.76 in attorney fees and costs as the prevailing 
party and refused to award Huber any of his attorney fees or costs. R I 988. LFUSA submits that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to LFUSA.29 LFUSA 
unquestionably prevailed in this action. Huber originally sought over $11 million in damages, 
section. Equitable relief is defined in paragraph (a)(3)(B)--and therefore the district courts of the 
United States have exclusive jurisdiction to decide appropriate equitable relief." 
28 Claims preempted are properly categorized as "dismissed." See, e.g., Atwood v. W Constr., 
Inc., 129 Idaho 234,240 (Ct. App. 1996) (affirming dismissal of state law claims preempted by 
ERISA). Thus, LFUSA is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) because 
it prevailed on breach of the CSO contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in the CSO. 
29 Huber affirmatively pled in paragraph 6 of Huber's Amended Complaint: "This lawsuit 
arises from a commercial transaction [as such term is defined in Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)] 
between Huber and LFUSA. Paragraph 6 was incorporated by reference in support of every 
claim-including Huber's ERISA claim." R 192-206. See Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,470 
(2011 ), reaff'g Magic Lantern Prods., Inc. v. Do/sot, 126 Idaho 805 (1995) (holding "allegations 
in the complaint that the parties entered into a commercial transaction and that the complaining 
party is entitled to recover based upon (a commercial transaction], are sufficient to trigger the 
application of§ 12-120(3 ). "). 
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yet was only awarded $180,000. LFUSA prevailed in toto on five of Huber's six claims and 
prevailed in part on the sixth claim.30 
Even if this Court were to find that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees and 
costs pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3 ), this Court may affirm the award of attorney fees 
under 29 U.S.C. Section 1332(g) because all the elements necessary to support the finding are 
present in the record. 31 There is no conflict between the standard employed by the trial court and 
the standard under ERISA.32 Attorney fees have been awarded against executives like Huber.33 
The trial court's findings and the record support an award of fees under ERISA. The trial 
court concluded Huber's testimony was not credible. Huber's main argument on appeal is that 
30 Huber sued, under the state law, for about $3.SM under the CSO, for $200,000 under the 
NDA, for a trebling of both amounts (to over $1 lM) as wages, for wrongful termination, and for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and alternatively, for violation of 
ERISA. LFUSA obtained summary judgment on: (1) Huber's claim for breach of the CSO; 
(2) Huber's wage claims; and (3) Huber's claim for breach of the covenant. R 621-44; 675-80. 
At trial, LFUSA prevailed on Huber's wrongful termination and ERISA claim. R 1409-21. Huber 
did not completely prevail on his NDA claim because he recovered only $180,000. 
31 "It is well established that this Court will use the correct legal theory to affirm the correct 
decision of a district court even when it is based on an erroneous legal theory." JR. Simplot Co. 
v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 853 (1991). 
32 Although a litigant need not be deemed "a prevailing party" to receive attorney fees under 
section 1132(g)(l), the litigant must show some degree of success on the merits. See Hardt v. 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242,243,252 (2010). 
33 See Feinstein v. St. Luke's Hark, CIV A, 10-4050, 2012 WL 4364641, *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 25, 2012) (attorney fees awarded against plaintiffs who acted in bad faith); Estate of 
Shockley v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 130 F.3d 403 (9th Cir. 1997) (district court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding approximately 10% of requested attorney fees to retirement benefit 
plan in ERISA case); Epstein v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., CV 04-0400 SVW, 2004 WL 
2418310, *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2004) (upholding award of fees for defendant where court found 
plaintiff and plaintiffs testimony not to be truthful). 
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Huber altered the legal status of the CSO through his own bad acts (i.e., naming himself the 
owner of a life insurance policy). Such an argument demonstrates Huber's culpability and bad 
faith in bringing this action under ERISA. Huber mislead the trial court by failing to identify the 
totality of his assets, even lying about his employment status. Huber declared, under penalty of 
perjury, that he did not have ajob as of December 20, 2014. See R 1795, ,-i 3; R 1963 ,-i 7 & Ex. B 
(a press release dated December 10, 2013, identifying Huber as being hired as Kahles USA's 
"new sales and business development manager"). 
H. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Huber's Motion for Fees and Costs. 
Huber's assertion that he prevailed "in total" on his only state law claim is erroneous. See 
§ G, supra. 
I. Huber's Claim for Attorney Fees on Appeal Should Be Denied, and LFUSA's Claim 
for Attorney Fees on Appeal Should Be Granted. 
LFUSA requests attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 
and 41, Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-120(3), and 29 U.S.C. Section 1332(g) for the 
reasons set forth in Section G, supra, as well as upon the following grounds. As it relates to 
Huber's claims under the CSO, Huber does not present a genuine issue oflaw. Huber's argument 
on appeal relies on opinions that did not concern Top Hat plans. Huber fails to address the 
majority rule, as well as the U.S. DOL's view that have held that a plan is more likely than not 
unfunded where, as here, the employee does not pay taxes on any plan benefit. Moreover, 
Huber's contention that LFUSA intended the cash value of any life insurance policy to be 
available to him if he left the company is untrue. Huber himself testified that he did not have 
LFUSA's permission to name himself as owner of any policy and did not mean for that to 
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happen. Huber further testified and introduced evidence that he returned the cash value ( only 
$14,000) because "It was theirs." Finally, Huber's citation to Hollensbeck v. Falstaff Brewing 
Corp., for the proposition that the trial court should have applied the law as it existed prior to the 
enactment ofERISA and the Top Hat exemption, does not present a genuine issue oflaw. The 
holding in Hollenbeck did not concern a Top Hat plan and has not been cited in a single opinion 
addressing forfeiture clauses in Top Hat plans in the thirty (30) years since the opinion was 
issued. See Bigda, supra, 898 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 ("Since ERISA intentionally omits top hat 
plans from its nonforfeitability protection, federal common law may not be used to create 
nonforfeitability protection under ERIS A."). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, LFUSA respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's holdings and award LFUSA its reasonable costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2015. 
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